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Abstract:  We test whether rural versus urban location, and the amount of social capital 
present in those locations, influence the performance of Small Business Administration 
(SBA) 7(a) loans originated between 1984 and 2012.  On average, we find that rural loans 
are about 11% less likely to default than urban loans, and that a standard deviation 
increase in social capital reduces default by about 5%.  Surprisingly, these two effects are 
largely independent of each other, even though social capital is substantially higher in 
rural places than in urban places.  Our findings advance the small business lending 
literature and offer insights for a more efficient allocation of SBA funds.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Commercial banks play a central role in providing credit to opaque small 
businesses.  By fostering close relationships with small businesses, banks can transcend 
the information asymmetries that prevent these firms from accessing capital markets.  
These information problems are especially problematic for new businesses, as well as for 
mature small businesses that have blemished credit records.  Lending to these firms can 
expose banks to substantial credit risk; banks that do so need to be expert at evaluating 
the creditworthiness of these borrowers.   
It is an article of faith among many that small, so-called community banks are 
better at this task than large banks.  Community bank advocates argue that in-person 
customer relationships develop more naturally at these locally-focused banks, and 
through these relationships banks can collect the soft (non-quantifiable) information 
needed to assess whether or not small businesses are creditworthy.1  Academic research 
offers support for this view.  Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) find that large U.S. banks 
(assets greater than $1 billion) rely more on hard information embedded in borrower 
financial statements when screening credit applications from small businesses, while 
smaller banks rely more on soft information about the character of the borrower.  
Similarly, Berger, et al. (2005) conclude that small banks are better able to collect and act 
on soft information and tend to lend to more difficult credits, while large banks lend on 
a more impersonal basis and have shorter and less exclusive lending relationships.  And 
Berger, Cowan and Frame (2011) find that even when small banks do use hard 
information to assess the creditworthiness of small business firms, they tend to use the 
consumer credit score of the business owner, not the more encompassing small business 
credit score used by large banks.2   
The advantages associated with relationship-based lending are likely to be more 
pronounced in rural places, where personal relationships are an integral part of the social 
fabric.  If one accepts the conventional wisdom that rural communities are closer knit 
than urban communities—i.e., they are places where “everyone knows each other’s 
business”—then this information grapevine will include the business community.  This 
will provide rural banks with a relatively low-cost endowment of soft information about 
 
1 The head of a community banking trade association has expressed it this way: “Because most community banks are 
locally owned and operated, they have strong ties to their local communities.  These banks have a close relationship 
with their customers and are quite familiar with their customers’ financial condition and their history and ability to 
repay (ICBA 2011).”  Two Federal Reserve economists have expressed it this way: “Community bankers typically 
know their customers better than bankers at larger organizations, and perhaps this knowledge of local people and 
local businesses offsets the exposure to local economic downturns. As a consequence, community banks seem to hang 
tight through the choppy waters of local economic downturns (Hall and Yeager 2002).”  
2 More recent research provides indirect evidence that bank size is inversely related to relationship-based, soft 
information lending.  Ogura and Uchida (2017) found that soft information acquisition declines after small bank 
mergers, but not after large bank mergers.  Cole (2017) shows that the decline in small business lending during the 
financial crisis was significantly greater at large banks than at small banks. 
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local businesses, over and above what is available to urban banks.  If the quality and 
quantity of this soft information advantage are large enough, rural lenders will be 
especially effective at loan screening and monitoring, resulting in a lower probability of 
small business loan default.  Perhaps just as important, the rural information grapevine 
may also transmit information about loan performance in the opposite direction, from 
the bank to the community.  To the extent that wider knowledge of loan default equates 
with a higher expected level of (psychically costly) community shame for the defaulting 
local businessperson, moral hazard incentives will be weaker and rural borrowers will 
work harder to avoid loan default.   
Our conjecture that rural banks may have competitive advantages in small 
business lending is based on more than just the social and civic underpinnings of rural 
commerce, the soft information that these communities generate, and the borrower 
behaviors that these circumstances may engender.  In general, small businesses tend to 
be hard information-deficient, and this should be even more likely for rural firms than 
for urban firms.  Allee and Yohn (2009) found that a firm’s size positively predicts 
whether its financial statements are compiled, reviewed or audited by a professional 
accounting firm.  Given the smaller size of rural firms, this would mean that loan 
applications from rural firms are less likely to supported by audited financial statements.  
Similarly, in small rural economies the re-sale market for fixed investments and 
specialized assets will be relatively thin, making it difficult for lenders to assess the losses 
given default associated with pledged collateral.  Finally, Berger and Udell (2002) argue 
that agency conflicts between bank shareholders and loan officers (the traditional 
repository of soft information) are more easily mitigated at small banks in small places.  
At such banks, managers are likely to have extensive personal knowledge of most 
business borrowers and participate in making and reviewing most business lending 
decisions.  Moreover, ownership concentration tends to be high at these banks and top 
managers are likely to be drawn from among that ownership, resulting in better corporate 
governance and hence better loan portfolio performance (Spong and Sullivan 2007).   
We provide empirical evidence consistent with these notions.  Our data are a 
random sample of 33,945 loans to small U.S. businesses made by 6,045 different 
community banks between 1984 and 2012, under the auspices of the Small Business 
Administration flagship 7(a) loan program.  For each of these loans, we classify the 
borrowing firm as either rural or urban based on whether it is located within or outside 
of an MSA, and we classify the lending bank as either rural or urban based on whether 
the bank office making the loan is located within or outside of an MSA.  Using a discrete-
time hazard model of loan default, we find that purely rural loans (i.e., loans in which 
both the borrower and the lender are located in rural places) are statistically and 
economically less likely to default than purely urban loans; this result suggests the 
existence of some undefined characteristic that we call ruralness.   
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We perform additional tests to identify the dimensions of this ruralness loan 
performance advantage.  First, for very small community banks (assets less than $250 
million in 2000 dollars), we show that ruralness is a joint product of rural banks lending 
to rural borrowers.  At these very small banks, purely rural loans are statistically and 
economically less likely to default than loans in which either the borrower or the lender 
(but not both) is rural.  This suggests that a shared rural culture is an important component 
of ruralness for very small banks, although we do not find this result for loans made by 
larger community banks.  Second, we show that ruralness is not necessarily a 
neighborhood effect.  Holding the geographic distance (in miles) between borrowers and 
lenders constant, loans between counterparties located in different rural counties are no 
more likely to default than loans between counterparties located in the same rural county.  
Thus, localness is not a necessary condition for ruralness, which suggests that ruralness is 
geographically portable.  Interestingly, we show that localness does matter for urban 
small business lending:  Loans between urban counterparties located in the same MSA 
are statistically and economically less likely to default than loans between urban 
counterparties located in different MSAs.  Third, we show that the ruralness effects in 
our data are distinct from social capital effects.  According to Putnam (2000) and others, 
social capital is the set of interpersonal networks within a community—examples include 
civic organizations, sports leagues, religious groups, non-profit associations, and voter 
participation in elections—and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise 
from those networks.  We show that small business loans are statistically and 
economically less likely to default in both rural places and in urban places where 
quantitative indicators of per capita social capital are high.  But even though (and perhaps 
not surprisingly) rural markets have higher average levels of social capital per person than 
urban markets in our data, adding social capital regressors to our models leaves the 
ruralness result statistically and economically intact.  That is, ruralness exists alongside, 
but is not caused by, high levels of social capital.   
Our results suggest the existence of informational and behavioral efficiencies in 
rural lending markets that are less present in urban lending markets.  As such, rural banks 
more closely match the classical description of a local bank as a repository of private 
local information that allows it to outperform both non-banks and non-local banks in 
the analysis of local creditworthiness.  Although the number of small banks in the U.S. 
has declined precipitously since the 1980s, rural banks continue to have a 
disproportionate presence:  About 48% of all community banks are located in rural or 
micropolitan areas, places that account for only about 16% of the U.S. population.3  But 
these banks also tend to operate well below what most banking economists would 
consider to be efficient scale:  In 2017, the median rural bank held only $147 million in 
 
3 Percentages calculated using data from Anderlik and Coffer (2014) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012), respectively.  A 
micropolitan area is a county or group of contiguous counties that are clustered around a central city with a population 
of less than 50,000.   
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assets and three-quarters of all rural banks held less than $300 million in assets.4  If the 
rural lending efficiencies we find here prove to be robust to ongoing technological 
change, then the independent small-town banking business model may continue to be 
viable in the future.5  The arithmetic is straightforward:  Holding information technology 
constant, rural lending efficiencies plus the rents potentially available in oligopolistic 
small-town banking markets would need to exceed the production inefficiencies from 
operating at suboptimal scale.  Gilbert and Wheelock (2013) provide some suggestive  
evidence regarding this calculus, by showing that small banks maintained their shares of 
local deposits in rural counties between 2001 and 2012 relative to large banks with 
branches located in those markets. 
There is a large literature on the importance of small business lending to the 
macro-economy, the scope and evolution of small business lending technologies, and 
the performance of small business loans and the banks that make those loans.  Berger 
(2015) and Udell (2015) provide the most recent surveys of this literature.  Only a small 
handful of studies address these issues in the context of rural banks, and the results of 
those studies are consistent with our discussion here.  Brickley, Linck and Smith (2003) 
showed that the office, ownership, and management structure of banks varies 
systematically across different markets and customer bases; they found that rural banks 
are more likely to be locally controlled, due to the advantages such banks may have in 
knowing customers and making decisions locally.  Cowan (2006) found that rural banks 
are less likely to use credit scoring for small business loans than comparable urban banks.  
Kittiakarasakun (2010) concluded that urban banks tend to rely more on verifiable hard 
information while rural banks tend to lend to nearby customers about which they have 
personal knowledge.  We extend this literature by comparing the default probabilities of 
small business loans made by small rural banks and urban banks, in tests designed to 
reveal how the informational environments in these markets influence loan performance.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Using relatively standard econometric cost function analyses, both McAllister and McManus (1993) and Wheelock 
and Wilson (2001) found increasing returns to scale for U.S. commercial banks with less than $500 million in assets.  
Estimates from more recent studies that use alternative methodologies are consistent with these findings (DeYoung 
2013, Chiorazzo, D’Apice, DeYoung, and Morelli 2018).  While further unit cost reductions exist as community banks 
grow larger than $500 million, the rate at which unit costs decline apparently slows.  In contrast, research suggests 
that scale economies may be unlimited for large banks that use high-volume production models that very different 
from community bank technology (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson 2012, Hughes and Mester 2013).          
5 With continued improvements in information technology, lenders have become increasingly able to lend fully or 
partially based on hard information.  See Berger and Udell (1995, 2006), Petersen and Rajan (2002), DeYoung, Frame, 
Glennon and Nigro (2010), Berger and Black (2011), Udell (2015), and Jagtiani and Lemieux (2016, 2018).  
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2. Hypotheses 
 
The aim of this study is to generate evidence useful for addressing the following 
broad question:  How and why does the performance of small business loans made by 
small rural banks and small urban banks differ?  To answer this (and related) questions, 
we compare and contrast the default rates for loans made by rural and urban community 
banks to rural and urban small businesses. 
It is natural to use default rates to draw inferences about the existence of lending 
relationships.  A true borrower-lender relationship generates soft information about the 
borrower’s creditworthiness that a bank can use to construct a sustainable lending 
strategy that reduces the likelihood of borrower default.  Just as important, lenders 
should be willing to incur short-term costs to develop and preserve a valuable long-term 
lending relationship, and hence will be more likely to restructure a troubled loan rather 
than calling that loan and forcing default.   
We posit and test four inter-related hypotheses in which the characteristics of 
agents (firms versus banks), types of agents (urban versus rural), agent locations (local 
versus non-local), and civic conditions (amount of social capital) predict the probability 
of loan default.  We state each of these hypotheses in a neutral fashion, so that each 
hypothesis supports a two-sided test that treats rural loans and urban loans 
symmetrically.  Let D(x) represent the probability that a loan will default, where x 
indicates locational information about the borrowing firm and the lending bank as 
follows: 
 
x = RR indicates a rural firm borrowing from a rural bank 
x = UU indicates an urban firm borrowing from an urban bank 
x = RU indicates a rural firm borrowing from an urban bank 
x = UR indicates an urban firm borrowing from a rural bank 
 
This four-way taxonomy of borrower-lender pairs is exhaustive and mutually exclusive.  
We use this taxonomy to state our first two hypotheses.   
 
H1. Ruralness Hypothesis:   The efficiency of loan contracting and monitoring in rural markets will 
differ from that in urban markets, due to differences in informational, institutional and/or cultural 
conditions in those markets.     
 
Using the notation introduced above, D(RR) < D(UU) is consistent with the existence 
of ruralness effects that make loan contracting and monitoring more efficient.  This 
finding would imply that relevant information on borrower creditworthiness is more 
available, this information is less costly to acquire, and/or borrower-lender relationships 
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are stronger in rural markets than in urban markets.6  Similarly, D(RR) > D(UU) is 
consistent with the existence of ruralness effects that reduce the efficiency of loan 
contracting and monitoring.   
Should our tests produce evidence consistent with the existence of ruralness, we 
will of course be interested in the source(s) of this ruralness.  Our second hypothesis 
examines whether ruralness depends on the borrower and lender sharing the same 
culture.     
 
H2. Shared Culture Hypothesis:   Agents of the same type—that is, urban banks paired with urban 
firms, or rural banks paired with rural firms—share informational, institutional and/or cultural 
similarities that make loan contracting and monitoring more efficient. 
 
All else equal, both D(RR) < D(RU) and D(RR) < D(UR) are consistent with shared 
rural culture, while D(UU) < D(RU) and D(UU) < D(UR) are consistent with shared 
urban culture.  These two outcomes are not mutually exclusive; shared culture effects 
can exist simultaneously in both rural credit markets and in urban credit markets.   
Testing our next hypothesis requires the following more detailed taxonomy of 
the relative locations of borrower-lender pairs: 
 
x = RRL indicates a rural firm borrowing from a local rural bank  
x = RRNL indicates a rural firm borrowing from a non-local rural bank 
x = UUL indicates an urban firm borrowing from a local urban bank  
x = UUNL indicates an urban firm borrowing from a non-local urban bank 
x = RU indicates a rural firm borrowing from an urban bank 
x = UR indicates an urban firm borrowing from a rural bank 
 
where “non-local” refers to a lender located in a city, town or county different from the 
borrower (details below).  This six-way taxonomy reorganizes shared-culture loans (RR, 
UU) into two types:  shared-culture local loans (RRL, UUL) and shared-culture non-local 
loans (RRNL, UUNL).  As such, this taxonomy continues to be exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive.  The finer detail permits us to examine whether ruralness depends on the 
borrower and lender being in close local proximity.     
 
H3. Local Lending Hypothesis:  Pairs of agents in the same local market have relatively low costs of 
information sharing and/or information revelation, making loan contracting and monitoring more 
efficient. 
 
 
6 Note that a lower default rate for relationship lending does not necessarily map into higher profitability.  Numerous 
other facets of loan production—such as pricing, optimal scale, diversification effects, and ancillary revenues—differ 
across the relationship and non-relationship lending models and have important impacts on bank profitability.      
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All else equal, D(RRL) < D(RRNL) is consistent with local market lending efficiency 
effects in rural markets.  Similarly, D(UUL) < D(UUNL) is consistent with local market 
lending efficiency effects in urban markets.  These two outcomes are not mutually 
exclusive; local lending efficiency effects can exist simultaneously in both rural credit 
markets and in urban credit markets.  While finding evidence of localness per se would 
not be surprising—for example, DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro (2008) found that 
localness, measured in terms of the geographic distance between borrowers and lenders, 
to be strongly and negatively related to loan default—this test may determine whether 
localness is relatively more important in rural or urban settings. 
At a fundamental level, one would expect the behavior of agents in both rural 
and urban places to reflect, at least on average, the social customs and societal 
expectations present in those places.  The network of interactions among the agents who 
live and work in a particular society, which in the end determines how well that society 
functions, has been referred to as the “social capital” of that society.  As described by 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), social capital impacts economic efficiency “by 
enhancing the prevailing level of trust.  In high-social-capital communities, people may 
trust each other more because the networks in their community provide better 
opportunities to punish deviants.  At the same time, in these communities people may 
rely more on others’ keeping their promises because of the moral attitude imprinted with 
education.”  The authors identify exogenous differences in social capital across 95 Italian 
provinces, and find that financial transactions that involve trust (e.g., accepting personal 
checks as payment, extending credit to households) are more likely to occur in provinces 
with more social capital.  Clearly, a small business loan is a financial transaction that 
requires trust, and as such the performance of small business loans should reflect the 
level of social capital present where the small business borrower and/or her lender lives 
and works.      
 
H4. Social Capital Hypothesis:  High levels of social capital in the local market make loan contracting 
and monitoring more efficient.    
 
All else equal, we expect to find D(high social capital) < D(low social capital) in both 
rural and urban markets.  If we find this result in rural markets and we find that rural 
markets exhibit greater amounts of social capital than urban markets—as one might 
expect, given our casual observations regarding the close-knit nature of rural places—
then we can conclude that social capital is an attribute of ruralness.  Note that social 
capital effects can be thought of as distinct from soft information effects:  A overall 
higher level of trust in a society encourages a high volume of small business lending; a 
greater amount of soft information in a society allows lenders to better determine which 
small businesses are and are not trustworthy.  
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2.1. Some identification issues 
 
Testing some of the above hypotheses is potentially problematic, because a firm’s 
decision to apply for a loan from its local bank, rather than from a bank outside its local 
market, is not exogenous.  This decision can depend on (a) the firm’s own default 
characteristics and/or (b) the default characteristics of the local bank’s loan portfolio.   
Let’s examine (a) first.  A borrower might leave the local market because she is 
known to be a bad credit risk and hence will be declined for credit by local lenders.  The 
results from an exodus of low quality borrowers to out-of-market lenders is pooled with 
the predicted local lending result:  D(RRL) < D(RRNL) and D(UUL) < D(UUNL).  But 
this pooling causes no identification problem in competitive local markets (where, by the 
local lending hypothesis, lenders will on average decline credit to local borrowers only if 
they are indeed low quality) or in non-competitive local markets (where lenders that 
restrict output will be declining credit to high quality, not low quality, local borrowers).  
The results from an exodus of low quality borrowers to out-of-market lenders is also 
pooled with the predicted shared culture result:  D(RR) < D(RU) and D(UU) < D(UR).  
This pooling could potentially cause identification difficulties.  If we find that in-market 
borrowers (say, RR loans) perform better than out-of-market borrowers (RU loans), then 
we could not confidently conclude that this is evidence of shared culture effects.  
However, if we find that in-market borrowers perform worse than out-of-market 
borrowers, then we could confidently reject the shared culture hypothesis.     
Now let’s examine (b).  Borrowers might have to go out-of-market if local banks 
have market power and constrain the availability of credit.  This is most likely in rural 
markets, where the number of banks tends to be small.  For example, assume that the 
marginal loan default rate in competitive local markets is 5%, but in monopoly local 
markets loan output is restricted and the marginal default rate is only 2%.  Then the 
marginal borrower that leaves a local monopoly market will have a lower default rate 
(2%) than the marginal borrower in the non-local competitive market in which she ends 
up getting her loan (5%).  Hence, if rural markets tend to exhibit less lending competition 
than urban markets, rural out-of-market borrowers will have lower default rates than 
urban out-of-market borrowers; that is, we would find D(RRNL) < D(UUNL) and/or 
D(RU) < D(UR).  Fortunately, these outcomes are not pooled with any of the results 
predicted by our formal hypotheses.   
Only a few studies have attempted to test whether rural borrowers face limited 
credit access.  Walraven (1999), using data from the 1993 National Survey of Small 
Business Finance, found that rural small businesses were significantly less likely than 
urban small businesses to apply for a loan, and that rural small business loan applications 
were significantly more likely to be accepted than urban small business loan applications.  
Briggeman and Akers (2010), using data from both the 2005 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey and the 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finance, concluded 
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that rural small business owners reported having fewer problems in receiving credit than 
their urban counterparts.  These findings are inconsistent with the notion that credit 
access in rural markets is restricted relative to urban markets.7  Nevertheless, in our tests 
we control for the effects of market power on both in-market and out-of-market loan 
default rates.   
 
3. Data 
 
We test our hypotheses for 33,945 small business loans originated by small U.S. 
commercial banks between January 1984 and January 2012 under the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) flagship 7(a) loan program.  The 7(a) loan program serves small 
business firms that are unable to access credit on reasonable terms without having a 
third-party guarantor, despite having sound prospects for repayment.  Banks select the 
firms to receive loans, initiate SBA involvement, underwrite the loans within SBA 
program guidelines, provide 100% of the loan funding, and monitor and report back to 
the SBA the progress of these loans.  All loans must be secured by the tangible assets of 
the firm, and each loan contract includes a loss sharing arrangement between the SBA 
and the bank lender:  A fixed percentage guarantee is set at loan origination.  In case of 
loan default, the lender receives an amount equal to the guarantee percentage multiplied 
by the remaining unpaid loan balance, but bears a loss on the remainder of the loan 
balance.  The guarantee percentage varies idiosyncratically across loans made in any given 
year, and has increased and decreased over time depending on the budgetary resources 
made available to the SBA. 
Our data come from a random sample of all SBA 7(a) loans with seven-year 
maturities originated during the 1984-2012 sample period, stratified to contain 20% of 
the loans originated in each year.  The majority of loans in the SBA 7(a) portfolio have 
contractual maturities of seven years, and SBA loans with maturities shorter (three years) 
and longer (fifteen years) than seven years have been shown to exhibit different 
intertemporal default behaviors (Glennon and Nigro, 2005).  From this initial random 
sample, we retain only the loans that were made by commercial banks with assets less 
than $1 billion (2000 dollars), consistent with our focus on the rural small business 
lending environment in which nearly all bank lenders are quite small.   
Table 1 displays the number of loans in our data and the annual distribution of 
those loans.  The number of loans varies substantially from year to year, predominantly 
due to annual variation in federal funding for SBA programs.  Across the entire sample 
period, 31.7% of the loans in our data were received by rural borrowers (the small 
business was located outside of an MSA) and 27.1% of the loans in our data were made 
by rural lenders (the bank’s lending office was located outside of an MSA).  At 
 
7 By itself, the Walraven (1999) finding could indicate that limited credit access discouraged rural firms from applying 
for loans.  But the Briggeman and Akers (2010) finding makes this possibility unlikely.     
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origination, the average loan had a principal balance of $180,000 and was made by a bank 
with $559 million in total assets (both in 2000 dollars).     
 
3.1. Default rates on SBA loans 
 
Default rates on SBA-guaranteed loans are high.  About one-in-six loans (17.6%) 
of the loans in our data defaulted before the end of the sample period.  However, despite 
this extraordinarily high default probability, expected losses on SBA loans are not much 
higher than expected losses on non-guaranteed small business loans.  This is because the 
high SBA guarantee percentages, which averaged 78.6% across the loans in our data, 
places a floor under loan losses given default.  By our rough calculations, expected loss 
rates are about 2.2% for SBA loans and between 0.8% and 1.3% for non-SBA small 
business loans.   
Our rough calculations are displayed in Table 2.  For SBA loans, the expected 
default frequency (EDF) of 17.6% comes directly from our data.  We derive the 13.4% 
loss given default (LGD) figure for SBA as follows:  We multiply a 21.4% exposure rate 
(i.e., 100% minus the 78.6% average SBA guarantee percentage from our data) by the 
contractual loan principal at end of each year, based on a seven-year loan amortization 
schedule at a 10.3% annual rate of interest (Glennon and Nigro, 2005), assume a uniform 
distribution for loan default over time, and calculate the discounted sum of these figures 
at an assumed 8% cost of capital.  For non-SBA loans we calculate expected loss rates 
two ways.  For Estimate A, we use the average 1.7% ratio of commercial and industrial 
(C&I) loans that are non-accruing or past due 90 days at U.S. commercial banks as a 
proxy for EDF, and Shibut and Singer’s (2014) 57% average loss rate for small C&I loans 
at failed banks to measure LGD.  Estimate B is simply the average aggregate net charge-
off rates for C&I loans at banks with assets between $300 million and $1 billion over our 
sample period.8   
These calculations imply that, despite the presence of generous third-party 
government loss guarantees, bank lenders put at least as much capital at risk when they 
make an SBA loan as when they make a non-SBA small business loan.  Thus, exposure 
to credit loss provide SBA lenders with clear incentives to monitor and mitigate risk in 
this portion of their loan portfolios.   
 
 
 
 
8 Shibut and Singer (2014) calculate the 57% LGD figure based on actual losses on individual C&I loans incurred by 
the FDIC during resolutions of small insolvent commercial banks.  We calculate the 78% LGD figure based on the 
reasonable assumption that all of the C&I loans made by $300 million to $1 billion banks are small business loans.  
Other studies report somewhat lower LGD figures, but they base their calculations on loan data from very large banks.  
Asarnow and Edwards (1995) found a 35% LGD for commercial loans made by CitiBank, while Schuermann (2004) 
found a 35% LGD for commercial loans to large publicly rated firms.  
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3.2. Borrower-lender location and loan default rates   
 
The SBA data include the state, city, county, street address, and zip code for each 
small business borrower and for each bank lending office (usually but not always the 
bank headquarters).  We link the zip codes to the 1990, 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census 
databases to determine whether borrowers and lenders are in urban or rural markets.  
Borrowers and/or lenders located in a Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are defined 
as urban, while borrowers or lenders located in non-MSA counties are defined as rural.  
We use these designations to assign each loan in our data to the four-way and six-way 
locational taxonomies defined above.   
Table 3 shows the distribution of loans across the four-way (panel A) and six-
way (panel B) locational taxonomies.  Not surprisingly, pure urban loans (UU) account 
of the majority of the data set.  About 62% of the loans are UU, while about 21% are 
pure rural loans (RR), with the remaining 17% having one foot in both types of places 
(RU or UR).  Rural borrowers are located in different counties than their rural lenders 
(RRNL) in about 25% of the pure rural loans (1,774/7,056), while urban borrowers are 
located in different MSAs than their urban lenders (UUNL) in about 28% of the pure 
urban loans (5,866/21,072).   
Table 3 also allows a first preliminary look at how default rates vary across 
geographic categories.  The raw data are consistent with the ruralness hypothesis, with 
RR loans defaulting 200 basis points less often than UU loans.  There is suggestive 
evidence that rural borrowers (as opposed to rural lenders) are the primary driver of the 
ruralness result:  RU loans defaulted 300 basis points less often than UU loans and 230 
basis points less often than UR loans.  The raw data are also partially consistent with the 
local lending hypothesis for urban loans, as UUNL loans default 280 basis points more 
often than UUL loans.    
  
3.3. Social capital and loan default rates 
 
Knowing the geographic location of borrowers and lenders allows us to assign a 
social capital score to each borrower, each lender, and each loan.  Researchers at the 
Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (Penn State University) have 
calculated and posted online annual social capital indices for 1990, 1997, and 2006 for 
most counties in the U.S.  These indices combine data on (a) the per capita number of 
civic, religious, political, professional, business, labor, and athletic organizations and 
associations in each county, (b) the per capita number of non-profit organizations and 
associations in each county, (c) the county response rate to the most recent mailed survey 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, and (d) the percentage of voting age county residents that 
voted in the most recent national election.  Previous research has found or theorized 
links between indicators such as these and higher levels of trust and reciprocity in society 
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and/or the marketplace (Putnam 2000; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004; Rupasingha, 
Goetz and Freshwater 2006).  A social capital index is then formed by standardizing the 
cross-county distributions of each of the four items to have zero means and unit standard 
deviations, and then summing the four standardized items within each county.  We assign 
the values of this standardized index to every loan in our data, using the annual index 
value (1990, 1997 or 2005) closest to the loan origination date.  We then create three 
social capital variables for use in our tests:  The social capital in the county of the small 
business borrower (Borrower SocCap), the social capital in the county of the bank lending 
office (Lender SocCap), and the average of the borrower and lender social capital (Average 
SocCap). 
Table 3, panel C shows the distribution of loans and loan default rates across 
data subsets defined by social capital.  Subset HH contains all loans for which both 
Borrower SocCap and Lender SocCap are above the 75th percentile of the population 
for all counties.  Similarly, subset LL contains all loans for which both Borrower SocCap 
and Lender SocCap are below the 25th percentile of the population for all counties.  The 
contents of subsets HL and LH are self-explanatory.  There are three observations of 
interest in panel C.  First, nearly one-half of the loans in our data (49.4%) were originated 
between borrowers and lenders in counties with high social capital (HH loans).  Second, 
HH loans were 560 basis points less likely to default than LL loans.  And third, loans 
with one counterparty (but not both) located in a high social capital county (HL and LH 
loans) were about 200 basis points less likely to default than LL loans.   
Table 3, panel D shows that social capital is substantially higher on average in 
rural places than in urban places.  Using the borrower market to make our comparisons 
(we find similar results using the lender market), both Borrower SocCap and Lender SocCap 
are statistically and economically larger in rural markets than in urban markets.  
Consistent with the data shown in the panel, the linear correlation between Borrower 
SocCap and a dummy equal to one for loans with rural borrowers equals 0.17, significant 
at the 1% level.   
 
4. Estimation methodology 
 
We test our hypotheses using a discrete-time logit model of loan default 
(Shumway 2001).  The model is constructed as follows:  Assume that each loan i (i 
=1,2,…,N) is originated during period t=0 and enters the model T times as a series of 
binary variables Di(1),...Di(Ti).  Di(t)=1 if loan i defaults during time period t and Di(t)=0 
otherwise, over the life of the loan.  For example, measuring time in calendar quarters, 
the event history for a 3-year loan will be five zeros followed by a one (0,0,0,0,0,1) if the 
loan defaults in the sixth quarter after it was originated, but will be a string of twelve 
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zeros (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) if the loan does not default.9  The N separate event histories 
for each loan i are ‘stacked’ one on top of the other, resulting in a column of zeros and 
ones having 
=
N
i
iT
1
 rows.  We define D*it as a latent index value that represents the 
unobserved propensity of loan i to default during time period t, conditional on covariates 
X and W: 
 
D*it  =  Xi   +  Wit   +  it       
 
where X is a vector of time-invariant covariates, W is a vector of time-varying covariates, 
 and  are the corresponding vectors of parameters to be estimated, and  is an error 
term assumed to be distributed as standard logistic.  We further define:    
 
Dit = 0  if  D
*
it    0 
Dit = 1  if  D
*
it  >  0 
 
Substituting the more compact notation Z = [X,W] and  





=


, the probability that 
Dit = 1 is given by: 
 
        prob(D*it  >  0)  =  prob(Z  +  > 0)        
        prob(D*it  >  0)  =  prob( > -Z )      
       prob(Dit  =  1)  =  (Z )     
     
 
where () is the logistic cumulative distribution function.  The model is estimated using 
standard binomial logit techniques.   
We specify the discrete-time logit model as follows to test the ruralness, shared 
culture, and local lending hypotheses:   
 
Pr[ Dit=1|Z ]  =  [ borrower-lenderi, loan controls, lender controls, 
borrower controls, market controls, yeart;  ]                    (1) 
 
where the binary dependent variable Dit equals one if loan i defaulted in quarter t, and 
equals zero in all other quarters during the life of the loan.  The test variables are 
 
9 Loans that are prepaid prior to their contractual maturity, or right-censored loans (still performing but not yet mature 
at the end of our sample period), are also represented by strings of zeros. 
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contained in borrower-lender, a vector of dummy variables comprised of either the 
four-way (RR, UU, RU and UR) or the six-way (RRL, UUL, RRNL, UUNL, RU and 
UR) taxonomy described above.   
We include four different categories of control variables (loan controls, lender 
controls, borrower controls, market controls) shown elsewhere to be statistically significant 
determinants of SBA loan performance (e.g., Glennon and Nigro 2005).  The vector of 
year dummies is included to absorb annual variation in loan default rates due to changing 
economic conditions, regulatory regimes, and the gradual adoption of small business 
credit scoring techniques during our sample period.  Large banks began credit scoring 
small business loan applications in the early 1990s.  In contrast, community banks did 
not begin using this new technology until some years later, and tended to use credit 
scores to complement rather than replace soft information collection (Frame, et al. 
2001).  Finally, there is evidence to suggest that rural banks were especially slow to adopt 
this technology (Cowan and Cowan 2006).  
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics and definitions for all the variables used in 
these tests.  Unless otherwise indicated as time-varying (TV), the variables are observed 
at the time of loan origination (LO).  Three of the control variables bear special mention 
because their inclusion helps in identifying our hypotheses tests.  First, Distance is the 
mileage “as the crow flies” between the borrower’s home market and the market in 
which the lending office is located, and we expect this variable to be positively related to 
the probability of loan default (i.e., assessing borrower creditworthiness and monitoring 
borrower financial condition is more difficult far away from the lending office).10  
Including the Distance variable reduces the chances of capturing pure distance effects in 
the cross-market RU, UR, RRNL and UUNL coefficients.  Second, HHI is the deposit-
share Herfindahl index for banks and thrifts in the borrower’s local market (constructed 
using the FDIC Summary of Deposits database).  Rural banking markets are much more 
concentrated on average than urban banking markets; in our data, HHI averages 0.272 
in rural markets but only 0.175 in urban markets.11  By including HHI we reduce the 
chances of capturing market power effects in the borrower-lender coefficients; including 
the interaction term HHI*Urban (where Urban is a dummy variable equal to one in urban 
borrower markets) allows the marginal impact of market power to vary in rural and urban 
markets.  We have no a priori expectations regarding the direction of these effects.  If 
lenders are able to use local market power to restrict output, then default rates should be 
lower because it is the marginal loan applicants that will be denied loans.  But if, as 
theorized by Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), market power gives lenders incentives to 
increase soft information-based lending, then default rates will be lower only if the 
investment in soft information improves credit screening and monitoring by more than 
 
10 The exact locations used to calculate Distance are the geographic Zip Code centroids for the borrower and the lender.  
In the regressions, we specify this variable as ln(Distance + 1).   
11 The U.S. Department of Justice characterizes local markets with HHIs exceeding 0.180 as “highly concentrated.” 
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the increased output reduces the creditworthiness of the marginal borrower.12  Third, 
%SBA is the percentage of the loan principal that is guaranteed by the SBA.  We include 
this variable to control for the severity of potential moral hazard incentives, in which 
banks originating and holding loans with higher guarantees may have fewer incentives to 
carefully screen and monitor loans.  We expect the probability of loan default to be 
positively related to this variable.  
We specify the discrete-time logit model as follows to test the social capital 
hypothesis:   
 
Pr[ Dit=1|Z ]  =  [ social capitali, borrower-lenderi, loan controls, lender controls, 
borrower controls, market controls, yeart;  ]                    (2) 
 
where the social capital test variable is defined as either Lender SocCap, Borrower SocCap, or 
Average SocCap.  We estimate equation (2) using various specifications to disentangle 
social capital effects from borrower-lender effects.  In some specifications we remove 
the borrower-lender vector to generate baseline estimates of the social capital effects.  In 
others we interact elements of the borrower-lender vector with social capital to test 
whether these two effects exist independent of each other, or whether one tends to 
dominate the other.   
 
5. Results 
 
Table 5 displays the full results for equation (1) estimated for 719,975 loan-
quarter observations using the four-way borrower-lender taxonomy.  The cells contain 
raw logit coefficient estimates, and a different borrower-lender dummy is excluded from 
each of the four columns.  The results offer support for both the ruralness hypothesis 
(RR loans are less likely to default than UU loans).  There is no support for the shared 
culture hypothesis for either rural loans (RR loans are not less likely to default than RU 
and UR loans) or urban loans (UU loans are not less likely to default than RU and UR 
loans).  We take a closer look at these findings in Table 6, where we re-test these 
hypotheses for various data subsamples.  Before doing so, we provide a brief discussion 
of the results for the control variables. 
All but a handful of the control variables carry statistically significant coefficients, 
and the coefficient signs are economically sensible.  As mentioned above, three of the 
control variables are perhaps more important than the other control variables for 
identifying our main hypotheses.  First, default rates are positively related to borrower-
lender distance (coefficient on lnDistance = 0.1037), an indication that including this 
 
12 Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) argue that a bank will be more willing to invest in costly information collection as 
its market power increases, because the reduction in the number of rival banks reduces the chance that its borrowers 
will switch banks in the future.    
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variable helps isolate pure borrower-lender distance effects from our hypothesized local 
lending effect.  Second, default rates decrease with market concentration in rural places 
(coefficient on HHI = -0.3414), an indication that this variable helps separate loan 
default reduction from market power-related restrictions in rural loan supply from the 
hypothesized loan default reductions associated with ruralness.13  Consistent with this, 
state-level restrictions on competitive branch entry are also associated with reduced loan 
default (coefficient on Branch Restrictions = -0.1059).  Third, default rates increase with 
the size of the SBA loan guarantee (coefficient on SBA% = 1.6524), an indication that 
this variable helps control for moral hazard incentives associated with making guaranteed 
loans.   
Age (the number of quarters since the loan was originated) is specified as a fifth-
order polynomial, which allows us to capture the shape of the loan default hazard 
function without imposing structure on the data.14  Northeast, Midwest, Central, Southwest, 
and West are dummy variables indicating the geographic region of the borrower; the 
negative coefficients on these variables indicate that default rates were highest in the 
omitted Southern region.  ∆Income and ∆Employment are time-varying measures of state 
economic conditions and carry the expected negative coefficients.  Loans to New 
Businesses are more likely to default, while loans to firms in the Service sector and loans to 
firms organized as Partnerships were less likely to default.  Loans made by banks with 
substantial experience with SBA loans—Certified and Preferred loan providers—were less 
likely to default.   
 
5.1. The ruralness and shared culture hypotheses 
 
Table 6 displays the default odds ratios from the four-way borrower-lender 
specification of equation (1), estimated for three different data samples.  Panel A shows 
the default odds for the full sample of 719,975 loan-quarter observations.  Panel B shows 
the default odds for a smaller subsample of 638,691 observations, in which we exclude 
cross-market (RU and UR) loans for which the borrower and lender are located less than 
25 miles apart.  While these borrower-lender pairs are by definition cross-market loans, 
the borrower and lender are likely operating in the same local economic and 
informational environment; removing these suburban-fringe loans from the data may 
allow better identification for some of our hypothesis tests.  Panel C shows the default 
odds for a subsample of 334,063 observations that further excludes loans made by banks 
 
13 Loan default rates also decline with market concentration in urban places, as indicated by the negative sum of the 
coefficients on HHI and HHI*Urban = -0.3414 – 0.2940 = -0.6354).  In both cases, however, the statistical significance 
is weak.   
14 Our main results hold strongly when we replace this highly structured polynomial specification with a simpler vector 
of seven age-of-loan dummy variables.    
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with assets greater than $250 million (2012 dollars).15  If the informational, institutional 
and cultural conditions found in rural markets result in better small business loan 
performance, it seems reasonable that these efficiencies would be especially strong at 
small rural banks where organizational structures tend to be flatter and less formal, 
allowing bankers and bank customers to interact more effectively and more frequently.   
We find strong support for the ruralness hypothesis.  In both panel A and panel 
B, loans between rural firms and rural banks (RR) are only about 89% as likely to default 
as loans between urban firms and urban banks (UU), all else held equal.  This result 
becomes both statistically and economically stronger in panel C, where pure rural loans 
are only about 81% as likely to default as pure urban loans.  Not only do small business 
loans between rural counterparties perform better than small business loans between 
urban counterparties, the lending efficiencies associated with ruralness are maximized at 
small rural lenders.    
We find no evidence in support for shared urban culture in any of the three panels.  
Indeed, we find the opposite result in panel A, where pure urban loans are about 20% 
more likely to default than RU loans, and about 13% more likely to default than UR 
loans.  This “anti-shared culture” result suggests that rural small business borrowers and 
rural lenders each bring something to the table—something that urban firms and lenders 
lack—that improves small business loan performance.  However, this result weakens 
substantially in panel B which excludes suburban fringe loans, and disappears entirely in 
panel C which excludes larger community banks.  We also find no support for shared rural 
culture in either panel A or panel B.  But we find very strong support for shared rural 
culture in panel C, where pure rural loans are only about 72% as likely to default as RU 
loans, and only about 70% as likely to default as UR loans.  These results suggest that 
shared borrower-lender culture is an important driver of our ruralness result, but these 
shared experiences and conditions are only effective for loans written by smaller rural 
community banks. 
As discussed above, endogenous borrower decisions to search for loans outside 
of their local markets (RU and UR loans) may prevent us from drawing confident 
conclusions regarding the shared culture hypothesis.  For example, when borrowers in 
competitive home markets (most likely urban markets, where average HHI is low) are 
denied credit and must search for a loan outside their home markets, one would expect 
a relatively high default frequency among these out-of-market loans, an outcome that is 
pooled with the shared culture hypothesis.  But we find just the opposite result in panel 
A:  D(UR) < D(UU).  Similarly, when borrowers in non-competitive home markets (most 
likely rural markets, where average HHI is quite high) are denied credit and must search 
for a loan outside their home markets, one would expect a relatively low default 
 
15 Using this $250 million asset-size threshold, panel C retains approximately half (52%) of the SBA loans from panel 
B.  In 1984, 85% of all U.S. commercial banks had assets less than this real dollar threshold; in 2012, 66% of all U.S. 
commercial banks had assets below this threshold. 
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frequency among these out-of-market loans, an outcome that is not pooled with the 
shared culture hypothesis.  Again, we find just the opposite result in panel C:  D(RU) > 
D(RR).   
 
5.2. The local lending hypothesis 
 
To test the local lending hypothesis, we re-specify equation (1) using the six-way 
borrower-lender taxonomy.  The main results are displayed in Table 7.  We find evidence 
in support of local lending efficiencies in urban markets.  In panels B and C, urban firms 
borrowing locally (UUL) were, respectively, only about 89% and 80% as likely to default 
as cross-market urban borrowers (UUNL), after controlling for borrower-lender Distance.  
In contrast, rural firms borrowing locally (RRL) were no more or less likely to default 
than cross-market rural borrowers (RRNL), after controlling for borrower-lender 
Distance.  Finding local lending effects for pure urban loans, but not finding them for 
pure rural loans, implies that the small business lending efficiencies associated with 
ruralness are not merely neighborhood effects but are at least to some extent portable 
across different rural markets.   
 
5.3. The social capital hypothesis 
 
Our initial tests of the social capital hypothesis are shown in Table 8.  We use the 
full equation (2) specification, with the exception that the borrower-lender variables are 
removed.  Each row displays partial results from a separate estimation.  All three social 
capital variables have a statistically negative effect on loan default, with Borrower SocCap 
having the largest economic impact.  For example, in panel A, a one standard deviation 
increase in Borrower SocCap reduces the odds of loan default by 10%, compared to a 6.4% 
decrease for Lender SocCap.  These results are robust in the subsamples reported in panels 
B and C. 
The final row in each panel of Table 8 shows the results from an alternative 
specification in which social capital is represented by the vector of borrower-lender 
market social capital quartiles from Table 3, panel C.  In panel A, a loan is about 18% 
less likely to default if both the borrower and the lender are located in highest social 
capital quartiles (HH).  Conversely, a loan is about 13% more likely to default if both the 
borrower and the lender are located in lowest social capital quartiles (LL).  But only the 
HH result is robust across all three panels. 
    In Tables 9 and 10 we include both the social capital variables and the vector of 
borrower-lender location dummies in the specification.  In addition, we interact the social 
capital variables with RR, to test whether ruralness effects dominate (or are dominated by) 
social capital effects, or whether these two effects exist independently in the data.  Because 
interaction terms are difficult to interpret in logit models (Ai and Norton 2003), we 
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estimate this specification using both a logit model (Table 9) and an OLS linear 
probability model (Table 10).  The results are statistically similar, with the exception that 
the interaction term is statistically significant (and easy to interpret) in the OLS model.  
Thus, we limit our discussion to the results in Table 10. 
As shown in column 1, the probability of loan default increases as lenders 
become more distant from borrowers (lnDistance), a result that is strongly robust to 
adding borrower-lender location and social capital variables to the regressions in the 
remaining columns.  This result is consistent with both the prior empirical findings and 
the standard information-based conjecture that screening and monitoring small 
businesses is less effective for firms located further away from the lender.  When the 
borrower-lender location dummies are included, the results are once again consistent with 
the ruralness hypothesis, especially in the small bank subsample.  In column 2, panel A, 
pure rural loans are around 11% less likely to default than pure urban loans in the full 
sample, but this increases to 20% less likely in panel C.16  These results are relatively 
robust to adding the social capital variables to the regressions.  In column 3, a one standard 
deviation increase in Borrower SocCap is associated with an approximate 9% reduction in 
the chance of loan default.17  The results for Lender SocCap and Average SocCap are similar, 
although it should be noted that the estimated impact of borrower social capital is always 
larger than the estimated impact of lender social capital.    
In column 4 we add the social capital*RR interaction variables.  The coefficient 
on this variable captures how a variation in social capital influences the default-reducing 
impact of ruralness, relative to purely urban (UU) loans.  The test for the social capital 
hypothesis is ∂Default/∂Social, which is statistically negative.  In column 4 of panel A, 
this derivative equals -0.00070 for RR loans; a one standard deviation increase in 
Borrower SocCap is associated with a 5.2% reduction in the chance of default, which is 
substantially smaller than the 11.1% social capital-induced reduction in the chance of 
default for non-RR loans.  This suggests that ruralness effects and social capital effects 
are substitutes in loan default probability—that is, the default-reducing benefits of social 
capital have been partially absorbed into the institutions and practices of rural small 
business lending, which diminishes the marginal benefit of an additional unit of social 
capital in these markets.  The test for the ruralness hypothesis is provided by 
∂Default/∂RR, which is also statistically negative.  In column 4 of panel A, this derivative 
equals -0.00077 for a loan with average borrower social capital; thus, a pure rural loan 
(RR) is 9.6% less likely to default than a pure urban loan (UU).   
 
16 The first calculation is -0.0009/0.008 = -0.1125, where -0.0009 is the estimated coefficient on RR 
and 0.008 is the mean quarterly frequency of default in our data.  The second calculation is -
0.0016/0.008 = -0.2000.    
17 This calculation is -0.0012*0.594/0.008 = -0.0891, where -0.0012 is the estimated coefficient on 
Borrower Social and 0.594 is the standard deviation of Borrower Social in our data.     
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To double-check these estimated partial derivatives, we also performed a 
Gelbach decomposition to disentangle the marginal effects of RR and Borrower SocCap 
(Gelbach 2016).  Using this approach, the full model is a linear specification (interaction 
variable removed) of the model in Table 10, panel A, column 4.  Our results are robust.  
The Gelbach-decomposed marginal impact of RR is -0.000763 and the Gelbach-
decomposed marginal impact of Borrower SocCap is -0.000687.  Although both of these 
estimates are slightly smaller than the estimated partial derivatives in Table 10, their 
economic magnitudes are very similar.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) loan recipients are among the most 
credit-challenged entrepreneurs in our economy.  Despite running businesses that are 
generating positive cash flows, these small business people are unable to obtain bank 
credit at reasonable market rates and terms without having a third-party guarantor.  The 
SBA provides partial loan guarantees to entice banks to make credit available to these 
small firms, so credit risk is shared between banks and taxpayers.  Nevertheless, the 
expected default rates on these loans are very high—historically, about one-in-six SBA 
loans defaults—so despite this risk-sharing arrangement, SBA lenders are placing no less 
capital at risk than other (non-SBA guaranteed) small business lenders. 
In a market-based economy, it is important that grass roots, job-creating 
businesses have access to credit.  But it is also important that any taxpayer funds used to 
subsidize credit extension to marginal small businesses be allocated efficiently.  We find 
that SBA loans made by rural banks to rural borrowers are substantially less likely to 
default, all else equal, than SBA loans made by urban banks to urban borrowers.  On 
average, purely rural loans are about 11% less likely to default than purely urban loans—
and when the banks making these loans are small (assets less than $250 million), this 
“ruralness” advantage increases to about 19%.  The direction of these results should not 
be surprising:  Small banks tend to rely more than large banks on building customer 
relationships that reveal information about borrower creditworthiness, and rural 
communities tend to be information-rich places where “everyone knows each other’s 
business.”  But the magnitudes of these results are substantial:  Compared to SBA loans 
written by small rural banks, nearly one-quarter more SBA loans written by small urban 
banks end in default.      
Are high levels of social capital—i.e., the sense of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arises from the existence of social networks (Putnam 2000)—in rural markets 
driving these results?  Empirical measures of social capital are indeed higher in rural 
places than in urban places.  Thus, it is plausible that a higher frequency of social 
interaction in rural areas reduces loan defaults because (a) borrowers work harder to 
avoid default because the costs of shame are high, and/or (b) lenders are better able to 
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screen and monitor loans because the cost of information is low.  We find that the 
probability of SBA loan default declines by about 5% with a one standard deviation 
increase in local social capital, but we find little evidence that this effect is stronger in 
rural markets.   
We offer two non-mutually exclusive interpretations of these results.  One 
possibility is that social capital (measured here and elsewhere as the availability of 
institutional networks within which people can interact and build trust) and ruralness (a 
way of life defined by a set of non-urban experiences, habits, and expectations) are largely 
independent phenomena and should be considered separate forces with regard to 
relationship lending.  A second possibility is that our ruralness result reflects the 
existence of intra-family networks that lie outside the social infrastructures measured by 
social capital indices:  That is, in rural places (where households are disproportionately 
comprised of related families with long social histories in the community) loan defaults 
are suppressed by family-related financial, commercial, and civic support that is less 
available in urban places (where households are disproportionately comprised of 
displaced nuclear families).  
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Table 1 
This table shows the distribution across years for a sample of 33,945 small business loans with seven-year maturities 
made by small U.S. commercial banks (assets less than $1 billion in 2000 dollars) under the Small Business 
Administration 7(a) loan guarantee program.   
Year loan 
originated 
Number of 
loans 
Percent of 
sample 
1984 544 1.60 
1985 408 1.20 
1986 597 1.76 
1987 600 1.77 
1988 555 1.63 
1989 600 1.77 
1990 675 1.99 
1991 695 2.05 
1992 848 2.50 
1993 1,039 3.06 
1994 1,577 4.65 
1995 2,638 7.77 
1996 1,593 4.69 
1997 1,526 4.50 
1998 1,438 4.24 
1999 1,170 3.45 
2000 1,114 3.28 
2001 1,380 4.07 
2002 1,453 4.28 
2003 1,631 4.80 
2004 1,754 5.17 
2005 1,529 4.50 
2006 1,298 3.82 
2007 1,368 4.03 
2008 1,334 3.93 
2009 1,405 4.14 
2010 1,579 4.65 
2011 1,490 4.39 
2012* 110 0.32 
1984-2012 33,945 100.00 
 
* Database ends in February 2012.     
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Table 2 
This table compares the expected losses for SBA and non-SBA small business loans.  Calculations for SBA loans are 
based on a random sample of 33,945 small business loans made under the Small Business Administration 7(a) loan 
guarantee program between 1984 and 2012.  Calculations for non-SBA loans are based on estimates from Shibut and 
Singer (2014), additional FDIC data, and call report data.  
 
 SBA loans Non-SBA loans 
  
Estimate A Estimate B 
Expected default rate (EDF) 0.1761 0.0173 -- 
Loss given default (LGD) 0.1242 0.5704 -- 
Expected loss (EDF*LGD) 0.022 0.010 0.0085 
 
 
1 The percentage of SBA loans in our data that defaulted. 
2 Calculation based on a 21.4% maximum loss of loan principal (100% minus the 78.6% SBA guarantee percentage 
in our data), a 10.3% loan interest rate for SBA loans (Glennon and Nigro, 2005, Table 2), a 7-year loan 
amortization schedule, a uniform distribution of loan default over time, and an 8% cost of capital.  
3 Average percentage of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans reported as past due 90 days or no longer accruing at 
U.S. commercial banks, 2000-2014 (call report data).  Note: These data are unavailable prior to 2000.   
4 Average loss given default on small commercial and industrial (C&I) loans at banks resolved by the FDIC as 
reported in Shibut and Singer (2014).  
5 Average losses on commercial and industrial (C&I) loans at banks with assets between $300 million and $1 billion, 
1992-2012.  Data from peer group analysis performing on the FDIC website.  
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Table 3 
This table displays loan default rates by borrower-lender locations and social capital for a sample of 33,945 small 
business loans with seven-year maturities made by small U.S. commercial banks (assets less than $1 billion in 2000 
dollars) under the Small Business Administration 7(a) loan guarantee program between 1984 and 2001.  ***, ** and * 
indicate differences from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Four-way borrower-lender taxonomy 
    Difference in means 
 borrower lender # of loans mean Default RU UR UU 
RR rural rural 7,056 (20.8%) 0.155 0.010 -0.013 -0.020*** 
RU rural urban 3,685 (10.9%) 0.145 -- -0.023** -0.030*** 
UR urban rural 2,132 (6.3%) 0.168 -- -- -0.007 
UU urban urban 21,072 (62.1%) 0.175 -- -- -- 
 
Panel B:  Six-way borrower-lender taxonomy 
   Difference in means 
 # of loans mean Default RRNL RU UR UUL UUNL 
RRL 5,282 (15.6%) 0.156 0.005 0.011 0.012 -0.011* -0.039*** 
RRNL 1,774 (5.2%) 0.151 -- 0.006 -0.017 -0.016* -0.044*** 
RU 3,685 (10.9%) 0.145 -- -- -0.023** -0.022*** -0.050*** 
UR 2,132 (6.3%) 0.168 -- -- -- 0.001 -0.027*** 
UUL 15,239 (44.9%) 0.167 -- -- -- -- -0.028*** 
UUNL 5,833 (17.2%) 0.195 -- -- -- -- -- 
 
Panel C:  High versus low social capital 
    Difference in means 
 borrower lender # of loans mean Default HL LH LL 
HH high high 8,083 (49.4%) 0.133 -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.056*** 
HL high low 1,589 (9.7%) 0.169 -- 0.001 -0.019* 
LH low high 1,855 (11.3%) 0.169 -- -- -0.020* 
LL low low 4,824 (29.5%) 0.188 -- -- -- 
 
Panel D:  Borrower markets and social capital 
  
 # of loans 
mean  
Borrower SocCap  
mean 
Lender SocCap  
Borrower in rural place 10,741 (31.6%) 0.1677 0.1953 
Borrower in urban place 23,204 (68.4%) -0.0006 0.0103 
Difference in means  0.1683*** 0.1850*** 
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Table 4 
This table displays descriptive statistics for variables used to specify equations (1) and (2).  The data are 
for 33,945 small business loans made between 1984 and 2012 under the SBA 7(a) loan program.  TV 
indicates that the variable is time-varying.  LO indicates that the variable is observed at loan origination. 
 
 33,945 loans 719,975 loan-quarters 
observed mean std dev mean std dev 
Dependent variable 
Default = 1 if loan defaulted in 
current period 
TV 0.176 0.381 0.008 0.091 
Borrower-Lender indicator variables 
RR = 1 if Rural borrower, 
Rural lender 
LO 0.208 0.406 0.255 0.436 
   RRL = 1 if RR loan in local 
market 
LO 0.156 0.363 0.201 0.401 
   RRNL = 1 if RR loan across 
different markets 
LO 0.052 0.223 0.054 0.225 
UU = 1 if Urban borrower, 
Urban lender 
LO 0.621 0.485 0.607 0.488 
   UUL = 1 if UU loan in local 
market 
LO 0.449 0.449 0.481 0.500 
   UUNL = 1 if UU loan across 
different markets 
LO 0.172 0.377 0.127 0.333 
RU = 1 if Rural borrower, 
Urban lender 
LO 0.109 0.311 0.085 0.279 
UR = 1 if Urban borrower, 
Rural lender 
LO 0.063 0.243 0.053 0.224 
Social capital variables 
Borrower SocCap Social capital index in 
borrower market 
LO 0.053 0.596 0.073 0.594 
Lender Social  Social capital index in 
lender market   
LO 0.069 0.583 0.093 0.586 
Social Capital  Average of Borrower 
SocCap and Lender 
SocCap 
LO 0.061 0.554 0.083 0.559 
Loan controls 
Age Age of loan in quarters TV 20.258 13.966 15.656 12.751 
Amount Loan amount (in $1,000 
of 2000 dollars) 
LO 180.466 244.960 180.116 213.748 
Distance Miles between business 
and lending office 
LO 62.284 208.246 48.890 178.417 
lnDistance Natural log of Distance LO 2.584 1.536 2.422 1.466 
Low Doc = 1 if loan is a “low 
documentation” loan 
LO 0.248 0.432 0.240 0.427 
SBA% Percent of loan principal 
guaranteed by SBA 
LO 0.786 0.120 0.799 0.105 
Lender controls 
Assets Assets (in thousands of 
2000 dollars) 
LO 559,271 575,611 465,197 523,020 
lnAssets Natural log of Assets LO 12.135 1.109 11.969 1.138 
Certified = 1 if SBA “certified 
loan provider” 
LO 0.086 0.281 0.123 0.329 
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Preferred = 1 if SBA “preferred 
loan provider” 
LO 0.177 0.382 0.150 0.357 
Table 4 (cont.) 
 
 33,945 loans 719,975 loan-quarters 
observed mean std dev mean std dev 
Borrower controls 
Corporation = 1 if organized as a 
corporation 
LO 0.622 0.485 0.573 0.495 
New Business = 1 if new business 
start-up 
LO 0.344 0.475 0.318 0.466 
Partnership = 1 if organized as a 
partnership 
LO 0.062 0.242 0.075 0.264 
Service = 1 if in service sector 
(SIC code = I) 
LO 0.343 0.475 0.338 0.473 
Market controls 
ΔIncome Annualized % growth in 
state-specific personal 
income since loan 
origination 
TV 0.232 0.217 0.183 0.193 
ΔEmployment Annualized % growth in 
state-specific, SIC-
specific employment 
since loan origination 
TV 0.062 0.092 0.059 0.085 
Branch Restrictions = 1 if borrower in 
branching-restricted state 
LO 0.417 0.493 0.517 0.500 
HHI Deposit Herfindahl 
index in borrower 
market 
LO 0.198 0.118 0.204 0.123 
Urban = 1 if borrower in urban 
(MSA) area 
LO 0.714 0.452 0.701 0.458 
Northeast = 1 if borrower in 
Northeast state 
LO 0.107 0.309 0.116 0.320 
Midwest = 1 if borrower in 
Midwest state 
LO 0.133 0.339 0.130 0.336 
Central = 1 if borrower in 
Central state 
LO 0.217 0.412 0.216 0.411 
Southwest = 1 if borrower in 
Southwest state 
LO 0.151 0.358 0.153 0.360 
West = 1 if borrower in 
Western state 
LO 0.253 0.435 0.253 0.435 
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Table 5 
This table displays the results from a discrete-time logit model of loan default model specified using the four-way 
borrower-lender taxonomy (RR, UU, RU, UR), estimated for 719,975 loan-quarter observations of SBA 7(a) loans 
originated by small commercial banks between 1984 and 2012.  ***, ** and * indicate a statistically significant 
difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Standard errors (not shown) are clustered at the 
lender level.  All variables are defined in Table 4.   
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
RR -- 0.0714 0.0138 -0.1118** 
RU -0.0714 -- -0.0576 -0.1832*** 
UR -0.0138 0.0576 -- -0.1255* 
UU 0.1118** 0.1832*** 0.1255* -- 
Age 0.9165*** 0.9165*** 0.9165*** 0.9165*** 
Age2 -0.0864*** -0.0864*** -0.0864*** -0.0864*** 
Age3 0.3525*** 0.3525*** 0.3525*** 0.3525*** 
Age4 -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** 
Age5 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Amount -0.1000 -0.1000 -0.1000 -0.1000 
lnDistance 0.1037*** 0.1037*** 0.1037*** 0.1037*** 
Low Doc -0.9950 -0.9950 -0.9950 -0.9950 
SBA% 1.6524*** 1.6524*** 1.6524*** 1.6524*** 
Low Doc*SBA% 1.0886 1.0886 1.0886 1.0886 
lnAssets -0.0328 -0.0328 -0.0328 -0.0328 
Certified -0.1822*** -0.1822*** -0.1822*** -0.1822*** 
Preferred -0.2426*** -0.2426*** -0.2426*** -0.2426*** 
Corporation -0.0380 -0.0380 -0.0380 -0.0380 
New Business 0.1605*** 0.1605*** 0.1605*** 0.1605*** 
Partnership -0.1950*** -0.1950*** -0.1950*** -0.1950*** 
Service -0.3067*** -0.3067*** -0.3067*** -0.3067*** 
∆Income -1.7884*** -1.7884*** -1.7884*** -1.7884*** 
∆Employment -3.6347*** -3.6347*** -3.6347*** -3.6347*** 
Branch Restrictions -0.1059** -0.1059** -0.1059** -0.1059** 
HHI -0.3414** -0.3414** -0.3414** -0.3414** 
HHI*Urban -0.2940 -0.2940 -0.2940 -0.2940 
Northeast -0.2050*** -0.2050*** -0.2050*** -0.2050*** 
Midwest -0.2409*** -0.2409*** -0.2409*** -0.2409*** 
Central -0.2797*** -0.2797*** -0.2797*** -0.2797*** 
Southwest  -0.0532 -0.0532 -0.0532 -0.0532 
West -0.1684*** -0.1684*** -0.1684*** -0.1684*** 
Intercept -7.8198*** -7.8912*** -7.8336*** -7.7081*** 
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
observations 719,975 719,975 719,975 719,975 
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Table 6 
This table displays partial results from a discrete-time logit model of loan default model specified using the four-way 
borrower-lender taxonomy (RR, UU, RU, UR), estimated for three different samples of SBA 7(a) loans originated by 
small commercial banks between 1984 and 2012.  ***, ** and * indicate a statistically significant difference from zero 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on coefficient standard errors (clustered at lender level, not shown).  
Year dummies in all equations.   
 
Panel A:  Includes full sample of loans (N=719,975). 
RHS variable omitted: RR RU UR UU 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
RR -- 1.074 1.014 0.894** 
RU 0.931 -- 0.944 0.833*** 
UR 0.986 1.059 -- 0.882** 
UU 1.118** 1.201*** 1.134** -- 
 
 
Panel B:  Excludes out-of-market loans (RU, UR, RRNL, UUNL) if Distance > 25 miles (N=638,691). 
RHS variable omitted: RR RU UR UU 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
RR 
-- 1.017 0.970 0.895** 
RU 
0.983 -- 0.953 0.879* 
UR 
1.031 1.049 -- 0.922 
UU 
1.118** 1.137* 1.084 -- 
 
 
Panel C:  Excludes out-of-market loans if Distance > 25 miles and excludes  
banks if Assets > $250 million (N=334,063). 
RHS variable omitted: RR RU UR UU 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
RR -- 0.719*** 0.698*** 0.809*** 
RU 1.433*** -- 0.971 1.160 
UR 1.391*** 1.030 -- 1.126 
UU 1.235*** 0.888 0.862 -- 
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Table 7 
This table displays partial results from a discrete-time logit model of loan default model specified using the six-way 
borrower-lender taxonomy (RRL, RRNL, RU, RU, UUL, UUNL), estimated for three different samples of SBA 7(a) 
loans originated by small commercial banks between 1984 and 2012.  ***, ** and * indicate a statistically significant 
difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on coefficient standard errors (clustered at 
lender level, not shown).  Year dummies are included in all equations.   
Panel A:  Full sample (N=719,975). 
RHS variable 
omitted: 
RRL RRNL RU UR UUL UUNL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
RRL -- 1.088 1.073 1.008 0.922 0.851** 
RRNL 0.919 -- 0.986 0.926 0.847** 0.782*** 
RU 0.932 1.014 -- 0.939 0.859** 0.793*** 
UR 0.992 1.080 1.065 -- 0.915 0.844*** 
UUL 1.085 1.181** 1.164** 1.093 -- 0.923 
UUNL 
1.175** 1.279*** 1.261*** 1.184*
** 
1.083 -- 
Panel B:  Excludes out-of-market loans (RU, UR, RRNL, UUNL) if Distance > 25 miles (N=638,691). 
RHS variable 
omitted: 
RRL RRNL RU UR UUL UUNL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
RRL 
-- 1.045 0.976 0.927 0.908* 0.808*
** 
RRNL 
0.957 -- 0.934 0.887 0.869 0.774*
** 
RU 
1.025 1.071 -- 0.950 0.931 0.828*
** 
UR 1.079 1.127 1.053 -- 0.98 0.872* 
UUL 1.101* 1.150 1.074 1.021 -- 0.890* 
UUNL 1.237*** 1.293*** 1.207*** 1.147* 1.124* -- 
 
Panel C:  Excludes out-of-market loans if Distance > 25 miles and excludes  
banks if Assets > $250 million (N=334,063). 
RHS variable 
omitted: 
RRL RRNL RU UR UUL UUNL 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
RRL -- 0.852 0.628*** 0.653*
** 
0.803*** 0.641*
** 
RRNL 1.174 -- 0.737** 0.766* 0.942 0.752* 
RU 1.593*** 1.357** -- 1.040 1.279** 1.021 
UR 1.532*** 1.306* 0.962 -- 1.231* 0.982 
UUL 1.245*** 1.061 0.782** 0.813* -- 0.798*
* 
UUNL 1.561*** 1.330* 0.980 1.019 1.254** -- 
 
Table 8 
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This table displays partial results from a discrete-time logit model of loan default model estimated for 719,975 loan-
quarter observations of SBA 7(a) loans originated by small commercial banks between 1984 and 2012.  Each regression 
[1] through [4] is specified as in equation (2) using the four-way borrower-lender taxonomy (RR, UU, RU, UR).  ***, 
** and * indicate a statistically significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on 
coefficient standard errors (clustered at lender level, not shown).  Year dummies in all equations.   
 
 
Panel A:  Full sample (N=719,975). 
Depende
nt 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio for 1 std dev increase in social 
capital 
Default Borrower SocCap -0.1770*** 0.838*** 0.900 
Default Lender SocCap -0.1132*** 0.893** 0.936 
Default Average SocCap -0.1751*** 0.839*** 0.902 
Default HH -0.2007*** 0.818*** -- 
 HL -0.0423 0.959 -- 
 LH -0.1392** 0.870* -- 
 LL 0.1244** 1.132* -- 
Panel B:  Excludes out-of-market loans (RU, UR, RRNL, UUNL)  
if Distance > 25 miles (N=638,691). 
Depende
nt 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio for 1 std dev increase in social 
capital 
Default Borrower SocCap -0.1744*** 0.840*** 0.902 
Default Lender SocCap -0.1200*** 0.887** 0.932 
Default Average SocCap -0.1773*** 0.838*** 0.906 
Default HH -0.2050*** 0.815*** -- 
 HL -0.0352 0.965 -- 
 LH -0.1326* 0.876* -- 
 LL 0.1419** 1.152* -- 
Panel C:  Excludes out-of-market loans if Distance > 25 miles and excludes  
banks if Assets > $250 million (N=334,063). 
Depende
nt 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio for 1 std dev increase in social 
capital 
Default Borrower SocCap -0.1405*** 0.869** 0.920 
Default Lender SocCap -0.1011** 0.904* 0.943 
Default Average SocCap -0.1390*** 0.870** 0.925 
Default HH -0.1823*** 0.833** -- 
 HL -0.0225 1.023 -- 
 LH -0.1373 0.872 -- 
 LL 0.0800 1.083 -- 
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Table 9 
This table displays partial results from a discrete-time logit model of loan default model estimated for 719,975 loan-
quarter observations of SBA 7(a) loans originated by small commercial banks between 1984 and 2012.  Each regression 
[1] through [8] is specified as in equation (2) using the four-way borrower-lender taxonomy (RR, UU, RU, UR).  ***, 
** and * indicate a statistically significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on 
coefficient standard errors (clustered at lender level, not shown).  Year dummies in all equations.   
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Panel A:  Full sample (N=719,975). 
lnDistance 0.0975*
** 
0.1037**
* 
0.1000*
** 
0.0997*
** 
0.1015*
** 
0.1010*
** 
0.1004*
** 
0.0998*
** 
RR  -
0.1118** 
-0.0887 -0.0952* -0.0952* -0.1022* -0.0878 -0.0971* 
RU  -
0.1832**
* 
-
0.1699*
** 
-
0.1693*
** 
-
0.1687*
** 
0.1675*
** 
-
0.1654*
** 
-
0.1639*
* 
UR  -0.1255* -0.1068 -0.1052 -0.1125 -0.1110 -0.1063 -0.1040 
Borrower SocCap   -
0.1770*
** 
-
0.1919*
** 
    
Borrower 
SocCap*RR 
   0.0518     
Lender SocCap     -0.1132 -
0.1252*
* 
  
Lender 
SocCap*RR 
     0.0426   
Average SocCap       -
0.1751*
** 
-
0.1956*
** 
Average 
SocCap*RR 
       0.0663 
Panel B:  Excludes out-of-market loans (RU, UR, RRNL, UUNL) if Distance > 25 miles (N=638,691). 
lnDistance 0.0934*
** 
0.0983**
* 
0.0948*
** 
0.0944*
** 
0.0962*
** 
0.0957*
** 
0.0952*
** 
0.0946*
** 
RR  -0.1112* -0.0895 -0.0965 -0.0935 -0.1008* -0.0874 -0.0973 
RU  -0.1285 -0.1174 -0.1171 -0.1134 0.1121 -0.1116 -0.1102 
UR  -0.0808 -0.0612 -0.0596 -0.0638 -0.0620 -0.0583 -0.0555 
Borrower SocCap   -
0.1744*
** 
-
0.1919*
** 
    
Borrower 
SocCap*RR 
   0.0592     
Lender SocCap     -
0.1200*
** 
-
0.1334*
* 
  
Lender 
SocCap*RR 
     0.0457   
Average SocCap       -
0.1773*
** 
-
0.2013*
** 
Average 
SocCap*RR 
       0.0743 
 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 22, No. 1 (Spring 2020) 27-63   
 
 
DeYoung et al.    *Small Business Lending and Social Capital*                                61 
 
Table 9 (cont.) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Panel C:  Excludes out-of-market loans if Distance > 25 miles and excludes banks if Assets > $250 million 
(N=334,063). 
lnDistance 0.0720*
** 
0.0524**
* 
0.0489*
** 
0.0483*
** 
0.0520*
** 
0.0519*
* 
0.0505*
* 
0.0502*
* 
RR  -
0.2114**
* 
-
0.1905*
** 
-
0.1963*
** 
-
0.1962*
** 
-
0.2015*
** 
-
0.1908*
** 
-
0.1981*
** 
RU  -0.1483 -0.1507 -0.1510 0.1529 0.1541 0.1528 0.1541 
UR  -0.1186 -0.1462 -0.1507 0.1315 0.1338 0.1411 0.1459 
Borrower SocCap   -
0.1405*
** 
-
0.1646*
** 
    
Borrower 
SocCap*RR 
   0.0555     
Lender SocCap     -
0.1011*
* 
-
0.1167*
* 
  
Lender 
SocCap*RR 
     0.0367   
Average SocCap       -
0.1390*
** 
-
0.1671*
** 
Average 
SocCap*RR 
       0.0615 
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Table 10 
This table displays partial results from an OLS linear probability model of loan default model estimated for 719,975 
loan-quarter observations of SBA 7(a) loans originated by small commercial banks between 1984 and 2012.  Each 
regression [1] through [8] is specified as in equation (2) using the four-way borrower-lender taxonomy (RR, UU, RU, 
UR).  ***, ** and * indicate a statistically significant difference from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, 
based on coefficient standard errors (clustered at lender level, not shown).  Year dummies in all equations.   
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Panel A:  Full sample (N=719,975). 
lnDistance 0.0009*
** 
0.0010**
* 
0.0009*
** 
0.0009*
** 
0.0010*
** 
0.0010*
** 
0.0010*
** 
0.0009*
** RR  -
0.0009** 
-0.0007* -
0.0008*
* 
-0.0007* -
0.0009*
* 
-0.0007* -
0.0009*
* 
RU  -
0.0018**
* 
-
0.0017*
** 
-
0.0017*
** 
-
0.0017*
** 
-
0.0016*
** 
-
0.0017*
** 
-
0.0016*
** 
UR  -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 
Borrower SocCap   -
0.0012*
** 
-
0.0015*
** 
    
Borrower 
SocCap*RR 
   0.0008*     
Lender SocCap     -
0.0008*
* 
-
0.0011*
* 
  
Lender 
SocCap*RR 
     0.0007   
Average SocCap       -
0.0012*
** 
-
0.0016*
** 
Average 
SocCap*RR 
       0.0009* 
∂Default/∂RR    -
0.00077
** 
 -
0.00081
** 
 -
0.00077
* 
∂Default/∂Social     -
0.00070
** 
 -0.00040  -
0.00064
* 
Panel B:  Excludes out-of-market loans (RU, UR, RRNL, UUNL) if Distance > 25 miles (N=638,691). 
lnDistance 0.0009*
** 
0.0009**
* 
0.0009*
** 
0.0009*
** 
0.0009*
** 
0.0009*
** 
0.0009*
** 
0.0009*
** RR  -
0.0008** 
-0.0007 -0.0008* -0.0007 -0.0008* -0.0007 -0.0008* 
RU  -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 
UR  -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 
Borrower SocCap   -
0.0012*
** 
-
0.0015*
** 
    
Borrower 
SocCap*RR 
   0.0009*     
Lender SocCap     -
0.0009*
* 
-
0.0011*
* 
  
Lender 
SocCap*RR 
     0.0007   
Average SocCap       -
0.0012*
** 
-
0.0016*
** 
Average 
SocCap*RR 
       0.0010* 
∂Default/∂RR    -
0.00076
* 
 -
0.00078
* 
 -
0.00075
* 
∂Default/∂Social     -
0.00065
** 
 -0.00041  -
0.00063
*   
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 22, No. 1 (Spring 2020) 27-63   
 
 
DeYoung et al.    *Small Business Lending and Social Capital*                                63 
 
Panel C: Excludes out-of-market loans if Distance > 25 miles and excludes banks if Assets > $250 million 
(N=334,063). 
lnDistance 0.0006*
** 
0.0004**
* 
0.0004*
* 
0.0004** 0.0004*
** 
0.0004**
* 
0.0004*
* 
0.0004** 
RR  -
0.0016**
* 
-
0.0015*
** 
-
0.0015**
* 
-
0.0015*
** 
-
0.0016**
* 
-
0.0015*
** 
-
0.0016**
* 
RU  0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 
UR  0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 
Borrower SocCap   -
0.0012*
** 
-
0.0015**
* 
    
Borrower 
SocCap*RR 
   0.0008*     
Lender SocCap     -
0.0006*
* 
-
0.0008** 
  
Lender 
SocCap*RR 
     0.0005   
Average SocCap       -
0.0008*
** 
-
0.0012**
* 
Average 
SocCap*RR 
       0.0006 
∂Default/∂RR    -
0.00148*
** 
 -
0.00151*
** 
 -
0.00149*
** 
∂Default/∂Social     -0.00052  -0.00038  -0.00051 
 
